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The Threat to the American Idea
of Religious Liberty
by Robert S. Peck"
With the Supreme Court unlikely to overturn its public school prayer
decisions,' those who seek a greater religious presence in education
have launched two complementary strategies intended to expand
existing guarantees of school-related worship rights.
The first strategy is a renewed effort to pass a school prayer constitu-

tional amendment utilizing the political muscle that conservative
religious interests demonstrated in the 1994 elections and which
resulted in the first Republican controlled Congress in forty years. The
amendment movement dangerously attempts to authorize the use of
government offices for purposes of religious indoctrination. Though
previous efforts at authorizing public school prayer through a constitutional amendment have failed,' the new political landscape forces those
concerned with constitutional freedoms to take today's effort seriously.
The second approach being pursued is a litigation strategy that seeks
to avoid traditional Establishment Clause' concerns by emphasizing the
* Former Legislative Counsel, American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU); Adjunct
Lecturer, Washington College of Law, American University. George Washington
University (B.A., 1975); Cleveland-Marshall School of Law (J.D., 1978); Yale Law School
(LL.M., 1990). The author was one of the drafters of the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(bXb). The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the
author and do not reflect positions of the ACLU.
1. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963);
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985); and Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992).
2. In each decade since the Court's first school prayer decisions, there has been an
effort to enact a constitutional amendment to reverse the effect of the Court's determinations. The last effort, in 1984, fell 11 votes short of the necessary two-thirds for approval
in the Senate. R. ALLEY, SCHOOL PRAYER 205 (1994) (providing a useful history of previous

attempts to amend the Constitution on this issue).
3. U.S. CONST. amend. I provides in pertinent part, "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion ..... The First Amendment also protects "the free
exercise" of religion.
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ostensible private status of the religious speaker in the public setting,
minimizing the actual involvement of public authority, and framing the
issue as one implicating only freedom of speech. This is a more
sophisticated philosophical and legal effort than the constitutional
amendment drive and is not without its appeal to civil liberties
advocates. Yet, it too is flawed because it has the potential to reduce
religious exercise to the status of mere expression, to convert the
Establishment Clause into a largely meaningless exhortation, and to
transform our public schools into arenas of religious rivalry None of
these results would be beneficial to the purportedly explicit goal of
guaranteeing religious liberty proffered by the policy's advocates.
There is a strong likelihood that these efforts, started as separate
enterprises, will converge, reconfiguring the constitutional amendment
movement into one about freedom of religious expression. The arguments against the two strategies will also then converge.
This article will examine the folly of attempting to amend the
Constitution to establish some greater right to engage in prayer in school
than currently exists, as well as the stalking horse nature of attempting
to denominate the issue as one of free -expression. It will survey the
development of the American idea of religious liberty as one that sees
government and religion operating in largely autonomous spheres and
how today's proposals amount to a rejection of that heritage. Furthermore, it will examine the insufficiency of declaring all student speech
private speech in order to bring it under the rubric of the First
Amendment's free expression protections." This article will demonstrate
that although the First Amendment does afford religious expression
some status as constitutionally protected free speech, the Establishment
Clause uniquely operates as a limitation on certain types of religious
expression in the classroom, an impediment that is not present when the
speech falls within other subject areas.
I.

FILLING THE VOID IN CHURCH-STATE LAW

The opening that has given shape to beth the constitutional amendment and litigation strategies to change church-state law is the Court's
own confused Establishment Clause jurisprudence. It can easily be read
as an invitation to formulate a new approach to issues of church and
state that would lend clarity to the crazy quilt of existing precedents,
which careen inexplicably from strict separationism to loose accommoda-

4. U.S. CONST. amend. I provides in pertinent part: "Congress shall make no law...
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances."
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tionism and sometimes beyond. The Court's difficulty in this area has
not escaped the attention of commentators. Former Solicitor General
Rex Lee once observed that "a decent argument can be made that the
net contribution of the Court's [Establishment Clause] precedents toward
a cohesive body of law.., has been zero. Indeed, some would say less
than zero."5 Historian Leonard Levy has added that "a strict separationist and a zealous accommodationist are likely to agree that the
Supreme Court would not recognize an establishment of religion if it
took life and bit the Justices.
One reason for the Court's incomprehensibility in this area of law is
its treatment of the basic test enunciated in Lemon v. Kurtzman.7 The
Court announced in Lemon that a challenged governmental action would
be upheld against Establishment Clause attack only if it (1) had "a
secular ...

purpose," (2) had a "principal or primary effect ...

that

neither advances nor inhibits religion," and (3) did "not foster 'an
excessive government entanglement with religion."'8 The Lemon test
was a synthesis of the Court's earlier church-state pronouncements in
Everson v. Board of Education of Ewing Township,9 School District of
Abington Township v. Schempp, 0 and Walz v. Tax Commission."
Despite this seemingly solid grounding, the Court has never been
entirely comfortable with the Lemon test. In 1973, just two years after
announcing Lemon, the Court conflictingly described the test's three
prongs as both "well-defined"12 and "no more than helpful signposts.""
The Court has declined to use Lemon in a small number of cases, 14 and

5.
338.

6.
7.

Rex E. Lee, The Religion Clauses:Problems andProspects, 1986 B.Y.U. L. REV. 337,
LEONARD W. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 163 (1986).
403 U.S. 602 (1971).

8. Id at 612, 612-13 (citations omitted).
9.

330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947).

10. 374 U.S. at 222.
11. 397 U.S. 664, 674-75 (1970).
12. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 772 (1973).
13. Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 741 (1973).
14. See, e.g., Board of Education of Kiryas Joel v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481 (1994)
(invalidating a school district created to serve a homogeneous religious community, rather
than follow general criteria for the establishment of new school districts); Marsh v.
Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (upholding the practice of appointing a legislative chaplain);
and Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982) (invalidating a religious exemption from a
charitable registration and reporting law because it established a denominational
preference). Some commentators might also include among this number Lamb's Chapel
v. Center Moriches School Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2141 (1993) (holding that a public school that
makes its building available to community groups outside of school hours, for social, civic,
and recreational uses, could not, consistent with the Free Speech Clause, deny use to a
church planning a film series on family issues) and Lee, supra note 1 (invalidating a public
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some justices have expressed their desire to overturn it. 5 The result
is that advocates before the Court in church-state cases are forced to
argue their
position both under Lemon as well as under alternative
16
theories.
The Court's confused treatment of Lemon 7 does not, however, mean
that the Constitution ought to be amended. The quest for a single
doctrinal gauge in so complex an area, where relations between the
secular and sectarian are forever changing and pervasive, is probably an
impossible dream."8 Any conceivable version of a school prayer or
religious expression amendment would not help the Court find a more
coherent or workable rule, a pursuit to which the Court has devoted
considerable time and energy. Moreover, reformulating organized prayer
as free speech would not assist the Court in rendering more principled

school's practice of holding an invocation and benediction as part of its graduation
ceremony). Yet, in both instances, the avoidance of Lemon was not aproduct of pursuing
a result-oriented jurisprudence as much as a decision that Lemon provided no further
insight into the issues before the Court. In Lamb's Chapel, the Court was satisfied that
'the issue was truly one of freedom of speech without implicating the Establishment Clause.
In Lee, the Court decided that the degree of coercion was sufficient to render further
analysis unnecessary.
15. Then-Justice William Rehnquist, for example, has opined that Lemon rests on
"historically faulty doctrine" that "causes this Court to fracture in unworkable plurality
opinions ... [that produce difficulty in) yield[ing] principled results." Wallace, 472 U.S. at
110 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
16. The Court has explored a number of alternative theories for church-state issues, but
has declined to engage in wholesale. substitution of these approaches for Lemon. In her
concurrence in Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring), Justice
O'Connor suggested an endorsement test that would find an Establishment Clause
violation when the government makes adherence to religion relevant to a person's standing
in the political community. Id. at 687-89. The Court seems to have incorporated the idea
of endorsement into the Lemon test. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 592
(1989). The Court has repeatedly rejected suggestions that a coercion test be employed.
See, e.g., 492 U.S. at 659 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
17. Justice Scalia has long been an opponent of the Lemon test. He indicated, more
colorfully than accurately, his frustration with the Court's sometimes-it-is-the-rule-andsometimes-it-is-not philosophy in an opinion in Lamb's Chapel,comparingLemon to "some
ghoul in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad,
after being repeatedly killed and buried, ... frightening the little children and school
attorneys .... " 113 S. Ct. at 2149 (Scalia, J.; concurring). Yet, Lemon will apparently
survive until the Court can devise a workable alternative, something that has proven as
elusive in this area of law as consistency in results has been.
18. Even the author of the Lemon test, Chief Justice Warren Burger, warned against
any "naive pre-occupation with an easy, bright-line approach for addressing constitutional
issues." Wallace, 472 U.S. at 89 (Burger, C.J., dissenting), In Establishment Clause cases,
he suggested that "the inquiry calls for line drawing, no fixed, per se rule can be framed.'
Id. (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 678).
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decisions, but ultimately would undermine the concept of religious
liberty by establishing an intrusive governmental role.
II. THE AMERICAN CONCEPT OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY
In proposing a school prayer amendment, Speaker of the House Newt
Gingrich was tapping into the frustrations of many devout Americans
who have been fed a steady diet of the myth that the Supreme Court
had overstepped its bounds and had "made God unconstitutional."" He
pledged to bring the measure to the floor of the House of Representatives
for a vote by July 4.' Gingrich demonstrated his own constitutional
ignorance on the subject when he defended his proposal on a television
talk show. Mistakenly claiming that a St. Louis youth had recently been
disciplined for saying grace over lunch, Gingrich declared, "'Most people
don't realize that it's illegal to pray' in public schools." 1 Of course, in
reality: "Nothing in the United States Constitution as interpreted by
this Court... prohibits public school students from voluntarily praying
at any time before, during, or after the school day."22
Gingrich initially endorsed language proposed at the end of the 103rd
Congress by Representative Ernest J. Istook Jr. (R-OK), who was given
responsibility for heading the school-prayer amendment task force. The
Istook amendment, H.J. Res. 424, read:
Nothing in this Constitution shall be construed to prohibit individual
or group prayer in public schools or other public institutions. No

person shall be required by the United States or by any State to
participate in prayer. Neither the United States nor any State shall
compose the words of any prayer to be said in public schools.'

Though crafted with an obvious eye to eschewing coercive conduct and
preventing government officials from creating a prayer like the Regents
Prayer that was invalidated in Engel v. Vitale, the amendment would

19. L. PFEFFER, GOD, CAESAR AND THE CONSTITUTION 201 (1975) (quoting Senator Sam
Ervin's (D-NC) initial reaction to Engel). Ervin later changed his mind and became a
vociferous supporter of the Court's school prayer decisions. See SAM J. ERWIN, JR.,
PROTECTING THE CONSTITUTION:

THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF SENATOR SAM ERvIN 237-48

(1984).

20. Laurie Goodstein, Clinton would support 'Moment of Silence' Religious Leaders
Gather Against School Prayer Amendments as President Clinton Clarifies His Stance,
WASH. POST, Nov. 23, 1994, at A3.
21. Rochelle L. Stanfield, The Amen Amendment 27 NAT'L J. 22, 26 (Jan. 7, 1995)

(quoting Gingrich on NBC's "Meet the Press"). The school district indicated that the boy
had been sent to detention for disciplinary reasons unrelated to his prayer over lunch. Id.
22. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 67 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
23. H.J. Res. 424, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (Oct. 7, 1994).
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have still permitted a public school teacher to choose any existing prayer
and lead the students in its recitation, only conceding that objecting
students could elect to sit quietly in the room. Nothing in its language
would have prevented the courts, consistent with the ruling in Engel,
from finding that any organized voluntary classroom or school assembly
prayer still violated the amendment's own "required participation"
prohibition because of the coercive environment of the classroom. Engel
found that religious ceremonies taking place under the auspices of public
school authorities were inherently coercive. 2' Subsequent decisions
have indicated no retreat from this principle.2' Thus, the Istook
proposal, if enacted, may well have been ineffective in accomplishing its
obvious purpose.
Even the most likely allies of a school prayer amendment objected to
the Istook formulation. At a conference shortly after Gingrich's
intentions on school prayer had been announced, Jay Sekulow, chief
counsel to the Pat Robertson-led American Center for Law and Justice,
indicated his clear opposition to the Istook language, largely due to the
authority it placed in school officials.2" Beverly LaHaye, founder of the
conservative Concerned Women for America, said some of her constituents would only support school prayer that was made explicitly in the
name of Jesus Christ, "which we know is not going to go through.""
The difficulties posed by Istook's language made LaHaye wonder "what
magician is going to write this language .... Prayer is not supposed to
divide people, but to bring them together. So if prayer is going to be the
big2 8battleground, maybe we should sit back and take a long look at
it."

Although congressional supporters of a constitutional amendment
returned to the drafting table after this experience and denigrated their
own proposal as merely something to get the discussion started,29 the
idea of an amendment is inconsistent with well established American
principles of religious liberty.
Fundamental to the American concept of religious liberty is the idea
that church and state operate in autonomous spheres. The idea has
Biblical roots: "Render to Caesar the things that are Caesar's, and to
24. 370 U.S. at 430-31. See also School Dist., 374 U.S. at 224-25.
25. See, e.g., Lee, 112 S. Ct. 2649.

26. Remarks of Jay Sekulow, Annual Conference of Americans United for Separation
of Church and State (Nov. 6, 1994).
27. Catherine S. Manegold, Some on Right See TacticalMisstep on School Prayer,N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 19, 1994, at 1, 8, col. 1.
28. Id.
29. Letter from Rep. Ernest J. Istook to James Dunn, Executive Director, Baptist Joint
Committee (Nov. 30, 1994) (letter on file with author).
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God the things that are God's."' ° The Framers of the Constitution and
Bill of Rights were products of the age of enlightenment. They knew, as
John Locke had taught, that "[nobody... [has] any just title to invade
the civil rights and worldly goods of [another], upon pretence of
religion." 1 Locke had enormous influence on those who created our
constitutional structure. His commitment to the idea of separation was
nearly absolute. He wrote: "I esteem it above all things necessary to
distinguish exactly the business of civil government from that of religion,
and to settle the just bounds that lie between the one and the other."32
Locke resoundingly rejected the notion that the "care of souls"' was
within the competence and authority of the civil magistrate. Even the
"consent of the people" was insufficient to vest such a power in civil
government, Locke wrote.' These views found ready support among
the Framers of the Constitution and Bill of Rights. They knew that the
legacy of English rule, where church and state were one, was a constant
state of religious strife, prejudice and intolerance.
This Lockean concept of how religion and government should relate
found expression in the idea of a "wall of separation" between church
and state, a metaphor that predated Locke's writings. In 1644, Roger
Williams, the great Baptist leader who founded Rhode Island as a colony
of tolerance after he was banished from Massachusetts for "new and
dangerous opinions"' on religion, found support in both the Old and
New Testaments for the proposition that the kingdom of God cannot be
found on earth and could only be corrupted by the intermingling of
church and state. Thus, he concluded that there must be a "hedge or
wall of separation between the garden of the church and the wilderness

30. St. Mark's Gospel 13:17. James Madison stated that it was an "aberration from the
sacred principle of religious liberty [to] giv[e] to Caesar what belongs to God, or join[]
together what God has put asunder .... " JAMES MADISON ON RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 90 (R.
Alley ed. 1985) [hereinafter MADISON].
31. JOHN LOCKE, A Letter Concerning Toleration 20, in 6 WORKS OF LOCKE (London
1823 & 1963 photo. reprint) (quoted in Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical
Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1432 (1990))
[hereinafter LOCKE].

32. LOCKE, supra note 31, at 9, cited in Schempp, 374 U.S. at 231 (Brennan, J.,
concurring). Locke further elaborated on this point when he noted that "civil government
.. I is confined to the care of the things of this world, and hath nothing to do with the
world to come," LOCKE, supra note 31, at 12-13, while also asserting that "churches have
[no] jurisdiction in worldly matters." Id. at 19.
33. JOHN LOCKE, A Letter Concerning Toleration (1689), in 5 THE FOUNDERS
CONSTTUTION 52 (Philip Kurland & Ralph Lerner 1987).
34. Id.
35.

1 ANSON PHELPS STOKES, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 195 (1950).
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of the world." He wrote that "All Civill States with their Officers of
justice in their respective constitutions and administrations are proved
essentially Civil, and therefore not Judges, Governours or Defendours
of the Spirituall or Christian state and Worship."3
The idea of separation took strong root in the new United States. In
every other country, church and state, kings and clergy, had formed an
alliance that had tended to corrupt each other by discovering an identity
of interests that were often more selfish than principled. Governments
and public officials would invoke religious authority to justify public
policy choices, and in the process, reinterpret the people's religious
obligations to serve their personal political objectives. Churchmen,
finding it in their own interest and having become part of the community of rulers rather than of the people, would use Scripture to support
these civil edicts. In return, the power of the state would be brought to
bear on dissenting ministers who would face "fist fights and jail
sentences in vain efforts to halt their preaching to the people."3 8 In
England, this trend manifested itself, inter alia, in new rulers, lobbied
by competing religious factions, rewriting the Anglican Book of Common
Prayers to further their own factional agendas, rather than advance
spiritual concerns.3 9 Surely, this was a support of religion at the
expense of others that was antithetical to the idea of religious freedom.
Even where toleration of other faiths was practiced, those who did not
share the established faith were subjected to discrimination and a range
of penalties, both small and large. In fleeing this kind of religious
persecution, many, like Williams, adopted the notion that separation of
church and state would be good for the church and for the state.
In November 1776, Thomas Jefferson addressed these issues in a
speech to the Virginia House of Delegates. He asked, "Has the state a
right to adopt an opinion in matters of religion?" He answered his own

36. Roger Williams, A Letter of Mr. John Cottons (1643), quoted in LEVY, supra note
6, at 184.
37. ROGER WILLIAMS, The Bloody Tenet (1644), in 1 GREAT ISSUES IN AMEmiCAN
HISTORY: FROM SETrLEMENT TO REVOLUTION, 1584-1776 201, 202 (Clarence L. Ver Steeg
& Richard Hofstadter, eds., 1969).
38. ROBERT ALLEN RUTLAND, THE BIRTH OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS, 1776-1791, at 84
(1955). For example, William Penn and one of his parishioners were arrested for holding
services on London's Gracechurch Street after their meeting hall had been padlocked. Only
the stout action of a brave jury under enormous pressure for a conviction from the
presiding lord mayor prevented Penn's conviction and imprisonment. Trial of William
Penn and William Mead, 22 Charles II, 6 Howell's State Trials 951 (1670).
39. Engel, 370 U.S. at 425-27.
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question with an emphatic no.' Freedom from government intermeddling in matters of religion was a part of America's revolutionary spirit,
even if its import and practice was not realized immediately.41
The battle to secure religious liberty in the United States was
pivotally fought in Virginia, when two giants of the new republic
proposed opposing pieces of legislation. Patrick Henry offered "A Bill
Establishing a Provision for Teachers of the Christian Religion," a
successor to an earlier proposal that would have imposed on all citizens
a "moderate tax or contribution annually for the support of the Christian
religion, or of some Christian church, denomination or communion of
Christians, or for some form of Christian worship." 2 Under the new
bill, all Christian faiths would have been treated equally. The measure
appeared to have a better chance of success than the alternative that
Jefferson had authored, "A Bill to Establish Religion Freedom."43 If the
Henry measure had passed, Virginia would have created a multiple
establishment of religion, allowing it to prefer all of Christianity to the
other faiths it might still tolerate.
Final passage was fortuitously put off until the following legislative
session, when Henry ascended to the governorship and, by virtue of that
office, lost sway with the legislature. Jefferson, ensconced in Paris as
the American minister, had to rely on James Madison to plot legislative
strategy for his religious liberty bill.
Madison drafted an argument that was widely and anonymously
circulated as a petition against the proposed general assessment bill. He
asserted that Henry's proposal would enact "a dangerous abuse of
power."4' He then stated a simple but unassailable principle: that
religious conscience, free from the dictates of others, is "an unalienable
right." 5 Thus, religious faith and practice was entirely beyond the
state's authority, "and that Religion is wholly exempt from its cognizance."4 Conceding even the smallest measure of this sort of power to
the state would enable it to "establish Christianity, in exclusion of all

40. Merrill D.Peterson, Jefferson and Religious Freedom,ATLANTIC MONTHLY 113,116
(Dec. 1994).
41. Even in 1791, the year the Bill of Rights was ratified, six states maintained official
churches or established religions. This practice ended in 1833. ROBERT S. PECK, THE BILL
OF RIGHTS AND THE POLITICS OF INTERPRETATION 93 (1992).

42. Levy, supra note 6, at 54.
43. THE MIND OF THE FOUNDER: SOURCES OF THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JAMES
MADISON 6 (Marvin Meyers ed., 1981). [hereinafter MIND].

44. JAMES MADISON, A MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE, reprintedin MIND, supranote

43, at 7.
45. Id.
46. Id.
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other Religions, [and] may establish with the same ease any particular
sect of Christians, in exclusion of all other Sects[.]' 7
Governmental favoritism for those religions that are recognized,
Madison observed, "degrades from the equal rank of Citizens all those
whose opinions in Religion do not bend to those of the Legislative
Instead, he. wrote that a separation of religion and
authority.'
government was necessary to assure religious freedom, in part, because
"[riulers who wished to subvert the public liberty, may have found an
established clergy convenient auxiliaries" in their efforts to use spiritual
authority to uphold "political tyranny."4 9
Madison's reasoning struck a responsive cord in Virginia, as it should
in today's United States. Lawmakers were swamped with "petitions and
remonstrances from all parts against the interposition of the Legislature
in matters of Religion.""0 The effort was successful in forging a new
legislative majority willing to enact the Jefferson bill in 1786. After its
passage, Madison wrote, "I flatter myself [to think that the provisions of
this bill] have in this country extinguished forever the ambitious hope
of making laws for the human mind."5' Justice Wiley Rutledge later
wrote that Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance was "at once the most
concise and the most accurate statement of the views of the First
author concerning what is 'an establishment of reliAmendment's
2
gion.'

5

The enacted religious freedom statute, an important forerunner of the
First Amendment's religion clauses because of the involvement of
Madison and Jefferson,53 began by acknowledging that religious beliefs
must proceed from a mind free to reject the interferences of authority.
In line with this notion, the Act rejects any government involvement in
assuring financial support for religion, because state financing for even
"this or that teacher of [a taxpayer's] own religious persuasion, is
depriving [those so taxed] of the comfortable liberty of giving his

47. Id. at 8.

48. Id. at 10-11.
49. Id. at 10.
50. WILLIAM LEE MILLER, THE FIRST LIBERTY 39 (1985) (quoting James Madison).
51. Id. at 43.
52. Everson, 330 U.S. at 37 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
53. Madison later wrote, probably in 1826, that the passage of the Statute for Religious
Liberty "was always held by Mr. Jefferson to be one of his best efforts in the Cause of
Liberty to which he was devoted. And it is certainly the strongest legal barrier that could
be erected against the connection of church and State so fatal to the liberty of both."
Quoted in ADRIANNE KOCH, JEFFERSON AND MADISON: THE GREAT COLLABORATION 31
(1950) (1980).
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The
contributions to the particular pastor [personally favored]."'
statute further prefaced its operative section by proclaiming that
[O]ur civil rights have no dependence on our religious opinions,
[anylmore than our opinions in physics or geometry; that "therefore"
the proscribing any citizen as unworthy the public confidence by laying
upon him an incapacity. . ., unless he profess or renounce this or that
religious opinion, is depriving him injuriously of those privileges and
advantages to which in common with his fellow citizens he has a
natural right....
It then declares that as a matter of law "all men shall be free to profess,
and by argument to maintain, their opinions in matters of religion, and
that the same shall in no wise diminish, enlarge, or affect their civil
capacities."'
That Madison, the principal architect of the Bill of Rights, would rely
upon the same arguments a few years later to fashion what became the
First Amendment is hardly surprising. As Felix Frankfurter observed,
to those who sought to secure religious liberty in the new constitution,
"[tihe battle in Virginia, hardly four years won, ... was a vital and
compelling memory in 1789."57
The principle established through this landmark legislative debate,
stated so many times by Jefferson and Madison, was put well by
Benjamin Franklin:
When a religion is good, I conceive that it will support itself; and, when
it cannot support itself, and God does not take care to support it, so
that its professors are obliged to call for the help of the civil power, it
is a sign, I apprehend, of its being a bad one ....
Thus, religion as a whole, as with individual denominations, rises or
falls on the basis of its appeal to the populace."9 Government subsidies
or endorsements are neither necessary nor desirable interventions in this
realm. In fact, the only outcomes that flow from government involve-

54. THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 206
(1861).
55. Id. at 207.

(Torchbook ed. 1964)

56. Id. at 207-08.

57. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 464-65 (1961).
58. Letter from Ben Franklin to Dr. Richard Price (Oct. 9, 1780), quoted in 1 STOKES,
supra note 35, at 298.

59. Summarizing paragraphs seven and eight of Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance, Justice Douglas put it this way: "The great condition of religious liberty is that
it be maintained free from sustenance, as also from other interferences, by the state. For
when it comes to rest upon that secular foundation it vanishes with the resting." Engel,
370 U.S. at 444 (Douglas, J., concurring).
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ment are adverse ones, either bending the spiritual to selfish majoritarian ends or sustaining a faith that reason no longer supports. The latter
result may prolong a religion's sway, while blocking the rise of better
and truer forms of devotion, whether these take place as a reformist
movement within the church or the establishment of a new and perhaps
competing denomination.
In a 1787 letter to Jefferson, Madison also expressed concern for the
persecution of minority faiths if government took on a supportive role
toward religion. He worried that if members of "the same sect form a
majority and have the power, other sects will be sure to be depressed"
for "a majority when united by a common interest or passion can not be
restrained from oppressing the minority.6'
The First Amendment fully recognizes these dangers and was added
to the Constitution with two clauses designed in combination to establish
religious liberty. The Establishment and Free Exercise clauses, although
creating occasional internal tension, generally work together to assure
autonomy between religion and government. During the congressional
debate over the amendment, its primary author, Madison, explained that
the Establishment Clause was intended, in part, to quiet public fears
that "one sect might obtain a pre-eminence, or two combine together, and
establish a religion to which they would compel others to conform." 1
He later wrote that the Constitution "[sitrongly guarded ... the
separation between Religion and Government .......
One of the most celebrated explanations of the amendment came from
Jefferson, who though not a participant in the debate was instrumental
in assuring that a bill of rights was appended to the Constitution. In an
1802 letter to the Danbury Baptist Association, and prepared with the
approval and scrutiny of his attorney general, Levi Lincoln, Jefferson
reiterated his longstanding position that religion was a matter "solely
between man and his God" and that the people had approved the
Establishment Clause as a recognition of this principle, "thus building
a wall of separation between church and state. "' Jefferson's explication of the Establishment Clause, the Supreme Court found in 1879,
should be "accepted almost as an authoritative declaration of the scope
and effect of the amendment thus secured.'

60. Letter of James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 24, 1787), quoted in ALLEY,
supra note 2, at 36.
61. 1 Annals of Cong. 758 (Aug. 15, 1789).
62. MADISON, supra note 30, at 90.
63.

Quoted in LEVY, supra note 6, at 182.

64. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1879). See also Everson, 330 U.S. at
16 (citation omitted) ("In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of
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Despite Virginia's venture in disestablishment and the adoption of the
First Amendment as a restriction on the federal government, several
states continued to support religion. These, too, were slowly undone, as
the idea that separation was an essential element of religious freedom
gained wider acceptance. In 1833, by a ten-to-one vote, Massachusetts
became the last state to end state support for religion.6 5 Thus,
Professor Michael McConnell has written: "By 1834, no state in the
Union would have an established church, and the tradition of separation
of church and state would seem an ingrained part of our constitutional
system."6
Nineteenth-century lawyer David Dudley Field observed:
The greatest achievement ever made in the cause of human progress
is the total and final separation of church and state. If we had nothing
else to boast of, we could lay claim with justice that first among the
nations we of this country made it an article of organic law that the
relations between man and his Maker were a private concern, into
which other men have no right to intrude. To measure the stride thus
made for the Emancipation of the race, we have only to look back over
the centuries that have gone before us, and recall the dreadful
persecutions in the name of religion that have filled the world. 7
The invention of church-state separation as a means of assuring the
fullest degree of religious liberty has paid rich dividends. In 1787, the
year the Constitution was written, reliable estimates put church
membership at less than fifteen percent of the American population.e
Today, according to the Census of Religious Bodies, membership tops
sixty-two percent.6 9 In addition, more than ninety percent of Americans describe themselves as members of one faith or another. 0
Comparisons with attitudes in other Western nations, many of whom
have state-supported churches, conducted by the Gallup Organization,
consistently find that the United States, adhering to the principle of
church-state separation, scores higher in affirming religion's personal
significance to its citizenry and in adherence in religious beliefs."

religion by law was intended to erect 'a wall of separation between church and state.'").

Id.
65. PECK, supra note 41, at 93.
66. McConnell, supra note 31, at 1437.
67. Quoted in 1 STOKES, supra note 35, at 37.
68.

PFEFFER, supra note 19, at 5.

69. BARRY A. KOSmN & SEYMOUR P. LACHMAN, ONE NATION UNDER GOD: RELIGION IN
CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN SOCIETY 6 (1993) [hereinafter KOSMIN-LAcHMAN].
70. Id. at 15-17.
71. Id. at 8.
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Rather than inhibit religious faith, as some have contended, separation
has allowed religion to prosper.
Even that most trenchant of observers of the American political scene,
Alexis de Tocqueville, marveled at the relationship of separation to the
preservation and strength of religious faith in the United States. "I
questioned the members of all the different sects," he wrote in his
seminal work, Democracy in America, "... they mainly attributed the
peaceful dominion of religion in their country to the separation of
Church and State ... during my stay in America I did not meet with a
single individual, of the clergy or of the laity, who was not of the same
opinion upon this point."72
Felix Frankfurter similarly believed the principle to be ingrained in
the American polity: "long before the Fourteenth Amendment subjected
the States to new limitations, the prohibition of furtherance by the State
of religious instruction became the guiding principle, in law and feeling,
of the American people."78
In fact, the principle was so well established that, despite the many
other changes made, the secessionist Confederate States wrote a
constitution that included the precise wording of the First Amendment,
thereby adopting the prevailing interpretation of the Establishment
Clause as acknowledging separation
of church and state as an integral
74
component of religious liberty.
III.

THE SCHOOL PRAYER CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT

Most proponents of a constitutional amendment that would permit
public school officials to conduct a morning prayer for students are either
ignorant of the premises of the American canon on religious liberty or
reject it outright. Unable to see past their own fundamentally Protestant perspective which can seem to those not in the minority perfectly
ecumenical, there is a notion that the reestablishment of public school
prayer can overcome contemporary ills and promote what is euphemistically called the "Judeo-Christian ethic."75 They ignore both the nature
72. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEvILLE, 1 DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 313-14 (Colonial Press 1900)
(1831).
73. Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203,215 (1948) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring).
74. Confederate Const. art. I,sec. 9, reprintedin 4 WOODROW WILSON, HISTORY OF THE
AMERICAN PEOPLE 325 (1902). This provision was unchanged, even though the framers of
the Confederate Constitution felt obliged to change the preamble to "invok[e] the favor and
guidance of Almighty God." Id. preamble, WILSON, at 313.
75. The phrase "Judeo-Christian ethic" appears to be nothing more than a politically
acceptable name for what was previously called the Protestant ethic. Judaism is quite
distinct from Christianity. Though there may be some shared moral values, these are
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of prayer as something more than the rote repetition that is likely to
occur in schools and the substantial evidence that the absence of
organized prayer is not the cause of modem predicaments.
Madison anticipated this claim when he wrote that when religious
devotion is not part of a person's spirit, "the official services of their
Teachers are not likely to produce it. It is more likely to flow from the
labours of a spontaneous zeal."'6 On the other hand, where religious
spirit has been instilled in young people, there is no need for intervention from educational authorities. Indeed, that intervention can only be
counterproductive, as it will turn an act of devotion into either a
tiresome chore or meaningless pap.
The argument that prayer would combat the decline in social values
is based on the idea that the index of societal ills, such as the violence
and divorce rates, increased after the 1962 decision in Engel. Yet, many
states did not permit organized public school prayer prior to the School
Prayer Cases." New York City, for example, did.7" Yet, few would
argue that New York City had fewer social problems than did South
Dakota, Nebraska or Wisconsin, all of which did not. Moreover, studies
have concluded that there is no discernible difference between public and

values common to virtually all faiths as well as to many good people who do not believe in
God. At best, it is a misnomer having little to do with religious outlook. At worst, it is a
form of meaningless God-talk, intended to have a visceral appeal. Talmudic scholar Jacob
Neusner has said 'theologically and historically, there is no such thing as the JudeoChristian tradition. It's a secular myth favored by people who are not really believers
themselves." Kenneth L. Woodward, Losing Our Moral Umbrella, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 7,
1992, at 60.
In that respect, it is reminiscent of the Yugoslav Constitution of 1921, Article 3 of which
declared the official national language to be Serbo-Croat-Slovenian as part of an effort to
create the impression of unity and equality among very different and antagonistic peoples.
F. HoNDIUs, THE YuGOSLAv COMMUNITY OF NATIONS 100 (1968). What made the effort
entirely laughable was that this fictional language consisted of two similarly spoken
languages with entirely different alphabets, Serbian and Croatian, and an entirely different
third language, Slovenian. Despite this legal fiction, official Yugoslav histories indicate
that this Constitution was a flagrant attempt by Serbs to consolidate their own power.
Jozo TOMASEVICH, PEASANTS, POLMCS AND ECONOMIC CHANGE IN YUGOSLAVIA 236 (1955).
The break-up of Yugoslavia in 1991 and the continuing warfare there can be traced to the
same raging ethnic rivalries that the 1921 Constitution attempted to paper over. The
lesson is that hyphenated attempts to find unity where there is none do not serve as some
magical incantation to deny the hegemony of majoritarian forces.
76. MADISON, supra note 30, at 92.
77. See, e.g., Schempp, 374 U.S. at 276 n.51 (Brennan, J., concurring) (indicating that
courts in Illinois, Louisiana, Wisconsin, South Dakota, Washington, and Nebraska had
found religious exercises in the public schools to violate their state constitutions as early
as 1890). Id. Other states simply did not adopt the practice.
78. Engel, 370 U.S. at 424 n.2.
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parochial schools in terms of levels of violence79 or, for that matter,
aptitude scores.s' Instead, the argument that blames the School Prayer
Cases for societal changes is a perfect example of sophistry.
Even so, school prayer proponents still adhere to the long rejected
notion that denying a governmental role in religious worship amounts
to hostility to religion,"' missing the point entirely that government
involvement in religion tends to be a corrupting and stifling influence.
Yet, as Tocqueville found when those he surveyed credited church-state
separation for the vitality of religion in the United States,'2 modern
pollsters find that Americans consistently score higher in adherence to
religious belief than citizens of any other democratic nation, despite our
laws giving public schools no role with respect to religious devotion.ss
A 1989 international Gallup poll found 18-to-24 year-old Americans,
those presumably most "harmed" by the ban on public school-sponsored
prayer, leading the world with 90 percent of them acknowledging
religion's personal significance to them."
As the prayer decisions well recognize, the deleterious effect of
government involvement in religion was not an invention of the recent
past. To use yet another examplej in explaining the Constitution's
prohibition on religious tests during the ratification debates, Oliver
Ellsworth, a signer of the Constitution, as well as a future Supreme
Court justice, wrote that "[iun our country every man has a right to
worship God in that way which is most agreeable to his own conscience."8' This construction leaves no role for governmental entities.
Any other approach, permitting the State to support religion, would
be a prescription for a civic religion dictated by prevailing political
winds. The court in Engel noted that the Church of England's Book of

79. CatholicEducatorSurprisesby Dataon Student Values, EDUCATION WEEK, Apr. 29,
1987, at 1, col. 1.

80. See Jean Merl, Are PrivateSchools Any Better?, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1992, at Al.
81. In the first of its school prayer decisions, the Court answered the hostility charge
by noting that "[n]othing, of course, could be more wrong." Engel, 370 U.S. at 434.
Instead, the Court asserted that the First Amendment "was written to quiet well-justified
fears which nearly all of them felt arising out of an awareness that governments of the past
had shackled men's tongues to make them speak only the religious thoughts that
government wanted them to speak and to pray only to the God that government wanted
them to pray to. It is neither sacrilegious nor antireligious to say that each separate
government in this country should stay out of the business of writing or sanctioning official
prayers and leave that purely religious function to the people themselves and to those the
people choose to look to for religious guidance." Id. at 435 (footnote omitted).
82. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
83. KO5MIN-LACHMAN, supra note 69, at 8.
84. Id.
85. Quoted in McConnell, supra note 31, at 1474.
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Common Prayer "set out in minute detail the accepted form and content
of prayer and other religious ceremonies" and was approved by
parliamentary acts in 1548 and 1549.' As new rulers came to power,
the Book was revised to reflect the views of the new political powers.
Powerful groups representing some of the varying religious views of the
people struggled among themselves to impress their particular views
upon the Government and obtain amendments of the Book more
suitable to their respective notions of how religious services should be
conducted in order that the official religious establishment would
advance their particular religious beliefs."7
The revolutionaries who founded the United States rejected the idea that
government had such a role or that theology ought to be subject to
revision through the offices of the State.
The danger of repeating the errors that the Founders rejected is
evident in the public schools, where impressionable young children are
placed in the hands of authority figures for so much of their time."0
The promotion of religion there, even as a generalized idea, can only give
way to transforming our educational institutions into arenas of religious
rivalries, where adherents will vie with each other to commandeer "the
machinery of the State to practice [their] beliefs."' 0
The dangers of sectarian indoctrination through the offices and
instruments of government are not just abstract concerns. Catholic
schools were originally established to preserve the religious identity of
children of that faith against the lure of the Protestant mainstream that
was being inculcated through the public schools. In a number of cities
during the 19th century, Catholics who continued to attend public
schools were persecuted for refusing to read from the King James Bible
or to participate in Protestant prayers. When an enlightened Philadelphia school board in 1843 authorized Catholic children to use their own
Bible or forego Bible readings, violent and fatal riots broke out in the
city. Catholic churches were even burned." In Ellsworth, Maine, a
Catholic priest was tarred and feathered for suggesting that a member

86. 370 U.S. at 426.
87. Id. at 426-27 (footnote omitted).
88. The Court has made much of dangers that arise from the convergence of school's
"great authority and coercive power through mandatory attendance requirements.... the
students' emulation of teachers as role models and the children's susceptibility to peer
pressure." Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 584 (1987) (footnote omitted).
89. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 226.
90. PFEFFER, supra note 19, at 175.
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of his congregation challenge the Bible reading requirement in court.9 '
Another court in Maine upheld the expulsion of a Catholic child who
refused to read from the King James Bible,92 while a Massachusetts
court found it permissible for a teacher to administer a beating to a
recalcitrant student.93
No one should think that these events from the last century are
unrepresentative of what might be contemporary America's reaction to
those who are of a different faith and who, on that basis, refuse to
participate in school-sponsored religious activities. When Jehovah's
Witnesses lost their first attempt to validate their children's refusal to
participate in classroom flag-salute ceremonies' because, in their view,
it amounted to worshipping a graven image, the Justice Department
reported "hundreds of attacks on Witnesses" within a two-week period,
during which Witnesses were seized and brutally beaten, and their
property destroyed.' Later, the Department revealed that "in the two
years following the decision, the files of the Department of Justice reflect
an uninterrupted record of violence and persecution of the Witnesses.
Almost without exception, the flag and the flag salute can be found as
the percussion cap that sets off these acts.'s
More recently, after two Oklahoma families successfully challenged a
school's practice of teacher-supervised morning prayer meetings, they
were constantly threatened and harassed, the children were persecuted

91. Id. The case was unsuccessful as the court equated Bible reading to the study of
Greek and Roman mythology and not a matter of any different order. Id. at 175-76.
Courts have long gone to these sorts of extremes in robbing challenged practices of
religious character to justify upholding the government's involvement. A recent example
of this was the Court's determination that because Christmas was already acknowledged
as a secular holiday, Chanukah had to be treated the same, otherwise it "would be a form
of discrimination against Jews" not to treat "Chanukah as a contemporaneous cultural
tradition." County ofAllegheny, 492 U.S. at 615 (footnote omitted). What these convenient
legal fictions ignore is that the Court has taken manifestly religious holidays and
trivialized them as something merely cultural and essentially secular. No rationale can
be offered that can transform Christmas from a religious celebration of the birth of Christ
into something else. Similarly, it is important to acknowledge that Jews do not celebrate
Chanukah as a "cultural tradition" or "secular holiday," and that no one else celebrates it
at all. Thus, by attempting to secure a legitimate basis for government involvement in
Chanukah, and similarly justify its treatment of Christmas, the Court has done religious
liberty a serious disservice by draining all devotional significance and meaning from what
are undeniably religious celebrations.
92. Donahue v. Richards, 38 Maine 379 (1854).
93. Commonwealth v. Cooke, 7 Am. L. Reg. 417 (Mass. Police Ct. 1850).
94. Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940), overruled by West Virginia
State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
95. Robert S. Peck, A Wrenching Reversal, 5 CONSTITuRION 51, 55 (Winter 1993).
96. Id.
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by school officials and called "devil-worshippers" by other children, one
family's home was firebombed,"7 and the other family was driven from
their home, which was subsequently vandalized.9 s
In a now-pending case in which the Fifth Circuit approved of a
preliminary injunction to end school-sponsored religious ceremonies, a
student-player challenged the practice of the coach leading the women's
basketball team in prayer. For refusing to join the others in prayer, she
was separated on the basketball court from the others as they prayed for
all to see, called "a little atheist" by a teacher in class, and taunted by
classmates and spectators. 99
These incidents, just a small sampling of numerous similar occurrences, demonstrate that it remains wise constitutional policy to hold that
"[by reason of the First Amendment government is commanded 'to have
no interest in theology or ritual. ' ""°° Justice Robert Jackson's observation continues to ring true: "We start down a rough road when we begin
to mix compulsory public education with compulsory godliness." 01
This statement should not be mistakenly read to refer solely to coercion
of the overt variety. The court in Engel was assuredly correct to find
that coercion was present in a facially voluntary system of statesponsored religious exercises. 0 2 "When the power, prestige and
financial support of government is placed behind a particular religious
belief," the Court held, "the indirect coercive pressure upon religious
to conform to the prevailing officially approved religion is
minorities
0
plain."1 3

Another point worth making about prayer is that no form of prayer is
universally satisfactory to all. For some, a prayer not uttered in the

97. Bell v. Little Axe Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 70, 766 F.2d 1391, 1396-97 (1985)
disapproved by Memphis Community School Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 304 n.5
(1986).
98. America's Constitutional Heritage (ACLU documentary 1994) (transcript on file
with author).
99. Doe v. Duncanville Ind. Sch. Dist., 994 F.2d 160, 162-63 (5th Cir. 1993).
100. Engel, 370 U.S. at 443 (Douglas, J., concurring) (quoting McGowan, 366 U.S. at
564 (Douglas, J., dissenting)).
101. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 325 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
102. The religious observance at issue did 'not require all pupils to recite the prayer
but permit[ted] those who wish to do so to remain silent or be excused from the room...."
370 U.S. at 430.
103. 370 U.S. at 431. See also Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2657 ("The degree of school
involvement here made it clear that the graduation prayers bore the imprint of the State
and thus put school-age children who objected in an untenable position."). Id.
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name of Jesus Christ is no prayer at all.' 4 For non-Christians, such
a prayer would obviously be sacrilegious.
The manner of the devotion is also an issue. As Justice William
Brennan has noted, "[many deeply devout persons have always regarded
prayer as a necessarily private experience."" ° For these people, as it
is for many others, prayer is not to be practiced publicly, and it may not
be legislated.'O'
Moreover, different faiths pray in substantially
different manners. While some might be satisfied to pray silently,
Buddhists, for example, chant aloud. Even among Christian faiths there
are differences: "Pentecostals stand to pray. Catholics and Episcopalians kneel. Presbyterians bow their heads."1 '7
It remains best for government to stay out of the business of religious
devotion, whatever secular benefits some might assert. Religious
activity under government aegis can only favor particular denominations
or substitute a generic civic religion for genuine forms of worship. The
operative principle remains: "what should be rendered to God does not
need to be decided and collected by Caesar."ls
IV. TREATING PRAYER AS MERE EXPRESSION
If the frontal assault of a constitutional amendment designed to
overturn the School Prayer Cases fails, some advocates of a different
approach to church-state issues have taken refuge behind the Free
Speech Clause. Speculation in Washington is rampant that the
language of the school prayer amendment to be considered will be
framed in terms of student religious expression.
The idea behind this approach is that if the speaker is a student,
rather than school authorities, all Establishment Clause problems are

104. Those who take this position are often evangelicals, a category that has been
estimated to include slightly more than one-quarter (25.9 percent) of the American
population. Richard N. Ostling, In So Many Gods We Trust, TmE, Jan. 30, 1995, at 72.
They cite the Bible, at John 16:23, 24, as requiring prayers be in the name of Christ.
105. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 284 (Brennan, J., concurring). Some of these are Christians
who cite the Biblical injunction that "[wlhen you pray, you must not be like the hypocrites,
for they love to stand and pray in the synagogue and at the street corners that they may
be seen by men .... When you pray, go into your room and shut the door and pray to
your Father who is in secret .... . Matthew 6:5,6.
106. For an insightful discussion of the impossibility of interposing religion on the civic
structure, see Justice Joseph Bradley's letter detailing his opposition to a constitutional
amendment that would have acknowledged the Nation's dependence on God, as well as, the
Biblical foundation of our laws and institutions. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 258 n.23 (Brennan,
J., concurring).
107. Eleanor Ivory, Release Time, TORCH (April 1994).
108. Zorach, 343 U.S. at 324-25 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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solved. This, of course, is not true, but is an immense oversimplification
of the constitutional issue. Advocates of this approach take considerable
comfort from a problematic graduation prayer decision of the Fifth
Circuit, Jones v. Clear Creek Independent School District,'"e which was
decided subsequent to the Supreme Court's graduation prayer case, Lee
v. Weisman.
Jones upheld the practice of student prayer at public school graduations because both the purpose and the primary effect of the graduation
prayer was to solemnize a public occasion, rather than to transform the
ceremony into a religious event."' In so ruling, the court ignored that
the lessons "of both Torcaso"'. and the Sunday Law Cases" 2 is that
government may not employ religious means to serve secular interests,
however legitimate they may be, at least without the clearest demonstration that'nonreligious means will not suffice.""'
Even if solemnizing did provide a secular rationale to permit the
graduation prayer practice, the Fifth Circuit found more was required,
namely the presence of several conditions in the procedure being
evaluated. First, the prayer had to reflect a majority decision of the
student body."4 Second, the prayer had to be non-sectarian and nonproselytizing, otherwise the court concluded that it would impermissibly
advance religion." 5 Finally, it had to be delivered by a student, which
the Court concluded removed any notion of state control.""
. The decision in Jones and these conditions are clearly inconsistent
with the Court's holding in Lee.117 Like the graduation prayer held
109. 977 F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2950 (1993).
110. 977 F.2d at 966-67.
111. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961) (holding that the State may not require
a belief in God to qualify for public employment).
112. See, e.g., Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
113. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 265 (Brennan, J., concurring) (footnotes added, footnote
omitted). Accord Lee, 112 S. Ct. 2649.
114. 977 F.2d at 968-69.
115. Id. at 971.
116. Id. at 970-71.
117. No opinion should be ascribed to the Court for failing to reconsider Jones. The
Supreme Court does not act as a court of error, correcting every mistaken ruling of the
lower federal courts. Justice Frankfurter once explained the meaning of a certiorari denial
this way:
The Court has stated again and again what the denial of a petition for writ of
certiorari means and more particularly what it does not mean. Such a denial, it
has been repeated stated, "imports no expression of opinion upon the merits of the
case .... " A denial.. carries with it no support of the decision in that case, nor
of any of the views in the opinion supporting it.
Agoston v. Pennsylvania, 340 U.S. 844, 844-45 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in denial
of cert.) (citations omitted) (footnotes omitted).
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unconstitutional in Lee, the electoral procedure approved by the Jones
court has as its object "a prayer to be used in a formal religious exercise
which students, for all practical purposes, are obliged to attend.""8 It
thus puts "school-age children who object in an untenable position" and
is inconsistent with the Court's oft-stated "heightened concerns with
protecting freedom of conscience from subtle coercive pressure in the
elementary and secondary public schools."" 9 The Lee Court noted that
"peer pressure, on attending students to stand as a group or, at least,
maintain respectful silence during the Invocation and Benediction...
though subtle and indirect, can be as real as any overt compulsion."'"
Thus, the Court concluded that the student who objects "has a reasonable perception that she is being forced by the State to pray in a manner
her conscience will not allow."' 2 ' Thus, the First Amendment violation
is palpable. Neither the intervention of a student election nor recitation
of the prayer by a fellow student changes the peer pressures involved or
the message of exclusion conveyed to the student whose rights of
conscience are violated.
That message of exclusion says to students who cannot in good faith
participate in the chosen prayer that they have a lesser standing in the
civil community than those of the majority religion. The practice
renders them servile to the religious majority before the public
institution that forms the most important and largest aspect of their
lives. It is constitutionally unacceptable to put students in this
precarious position at a public school. As Justice O'Connor has written,
a violation of the Establishment Clause occurs when "government makes
religion relevant to a person's standing in the political
adherence to
" 122
community.

Moreover, the electoral procedure that the Jones court found to be a
saving grace was emphatically rejected by the Supreme Court in Lee:
"While in some societies the wishes of the majority might prevail, the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment is addressed to this
contingency and rejects [it]. The Constitution forbids the State to exact
religious conformity from a student as the price of attending her own
high school graduation.""
118. Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2656.
119. Id. at 2658.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 69 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
123. Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2660. As the Supreme Court noted in one of the most important
religious liberty decisions ever, our fundamental rights "may not be submitted to vote; they
depend on the outcome of no elections." Barnette, 319 U.S. at 638 (permitting Jehovah's
Witnesses to refuse to salute the American flag in public classroom Pledge of Allegiance
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Majority decision-making has never been thought to abrogate the state
role.'" The delegation of authority to a student vote or a student body
remains the exercise of state power, subject to the Constitution's
commands. The Court has long recognized that government may not
sponsor "a religious exercise even with the consent of the majority of
those affected" and "has never meant that a majority could use the
machinery of the State to practice its beliefs. " "
Madison, as he was wont to do, anticipated the concern. During
Virginia's ratification convention, he discussed liberty of conscience in
terms that recognized that religious "freedom arises from that multiplicity of sects which pervades America, and which is the best and only
security for religious liberty in any society; for where there is such a
variety of sects, there cannot be a majority of anyone sect to oppress and
If Madison thought the United States was
persecute the rest.""
pluralistic then, he would be both amazed and even more adamant about
the need for government to be uninvolved in religious worship today
with the dazzling array of faiths that are represented among our
citizenry 27
The nonsectarian nature of the prayers also does not change the
constitutional analysis; the use of prayers remains nothing less than a

ceremonies without penalty).
124. Justice Joseph Story wrote:

The prescriptions in favour of liberty ought to be levelled against that quarter,
where the greatest danger lies, namely, that which possesses the highest
prerogative of power. But this is not found in the executive or legislative
department of government; but in the body of the people, operating by the
majority against the minority.
JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUION OF THE UNITED STATES § 982, at 697
(1833; 1987 reprint).
125. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 225-26.
126. 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTTrUTION 330 (Jonathan Elliott ed. 1836) (June 12, 1788). These sentiments
were a frequent theme for Madison. In his Memorial and Remonstrance, he expressed
concern about sects combining to exercise civil power to their own advantage. See text
accompanying notes 44-49. In FederalistNo. 51, he wrote that "security for civil rights
must be the same as that for religious rights. It consists in the one case in the multiplicity
of interests, and in the other in the multiplicity of sects." The Federalist No. 51, at 324 (J.
Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
127. In 1963, Justice Brennan wrote that:
[Ojur religious composition makes us a vastly more diverse people than were our
forefathers. They knew differences chiefly among Protestant sects. Today the
Nation is far more heterogeneous religiously, including as it does substantial
minorities not only of Catholics and Jews but as well of those who worship
according to no version of the Bible and those who worship no God at all.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 240-41 (Brennan, J., concurring) (footnotes omitted).
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religious exercise.s The requirement that such prayers be nonsectarian and nonproselytizing raises additional constitutional concerns.
Contrary to the Fifth Circuit's holding that this form of prayer "minimizes any such advancement of religion"129 and involves no excessive
government entanglement with religion, 13° the required generic format
of the prayer, in fact, maximizes State intrusion into religious affairs.
Since only prayers that are nondenominational and not calculated to
increase religious devotion could be uttered under the standard adopted
by the Fifth Circuit, public school authorities must approve or reject the
students' proposed prayers. Yet, nothing could be more. foreign to
religious liberty, and the Court's First Amendment jurisprudence, than
the requirement of a government stamp of approval on particular
prayers. 131
The decision in Jones also ignored the oddity of a "nonsectarian"
prayer. No prayer is so universal that all can say it consistently with
their faith. It is either no prayer at all because it is generic and so
watered-down that religious worship becomes something representing
the lowest common denominator of devotion, insulting both to nonbelievers and those who are devout, or it is a prayer consistent with
certain faiths that expresses a governmental preference for those
religions over others. In any event, permitting any government role
establishes a form of government-sanctioned religious worship, which is
what the plain words of the First Amendment forbid. 2 The religious
clauses guarantee that public officials cannot "control, support or
influence the kinds of prayer the American people can say."33 This
constitutional injunction should not be changed.
The final problem with the procedure approved by the Fifth Circuit is
that the school district continues to sponsor the graduation ceremony
and all elements of it that are offered as a part of the ceremony's official
program." Thus, when school officials carve out a period for prayer,

128. Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2658; see also id. at 2671 (Souter, J., concurring).
129. 977 F.2d at 967.
130. Id.
131. See Engel, 370 U.S. at 429 (The Framers knew that "one of the greatest dangers
to the freedom of the individual to worship in his own way lay in the Government's placing
its official stamp of approval upon one particular kind of prayer or one particular form of
religious services."). Id.
132. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 236 (1990) ("a State may not
influence the form of any religious activity"). Id.
133. 370 U.S. at 429.
134. Compare Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988) (holding that
school-sponsored publications and activities are not public forums open to indiscriminate
use by students, and that because such publications carry the school's imprimatur they
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even at student request, the religious expression that occurs must be
imputed to school officials. Here, as in other cases where the Court has
invalidated the practice, educational administrators have authorized
"public school buildings [to be] used for the dissemination of religious
doctrines"' to the students the law has placed within the officials'
charge. By knowingly turning its ceremony over to those who have
religious purposes, the school "affords ... an invaluable aid in that it
helps to provide pupils for their religious classes through use of the
state's compulsory public school machinery."' 36 Because no public
forum is established for all possible varieties of student expression," 7
a graduating student still has the "reasonable perception that she is
being forced by the State to pray." "
Testifying before the House Judiciary Committee in 1980, Yale law
professor Thomas Emerson said that having students perform the
religious service "does not eliminate the pressure to conform and so an
In any
organization [of the service] by children is inconceivable ....
of
school
auspices
event the sermon still takes place in the school under
" 139
officials and in the context of a public institution.
For all of these reasons, a number of federal courts have rejected the
Jones analysis. 140 Most recently, the Ninth Circuit held that "[g]iving

may be subject to official editorial control over the style and content of the students' speech
contained therein).
135. McCollum, 333 U.S. at 212.
136. Id.
137. On the other hand, consider the situation of the valedictorian of the graduating
class. Assume that this student speaker was chosen in the usual manner (e.g., on the basis
of the highest grade-point average), the school has established a limited public forum.
Thus, they would have no right to censor the student's speech whether the student
criticizes the school's administration or offers a prayer for the graduating class's future.
Like the proverbial soapbox, this is free speech, understood as that, with no governmental
purpose to advance religion.
138. Lee, 112 S.Ct. at 2658.
139. Prayerin Public Schools and Buildings-FederalCourt JurisdictionBefore the
Subcomrnm. on Courtsof the House Comm. on the Judiciary,96th Cong., 2d Sess. 335 (1980)
(statement of Thomas Emerson, professor, Yale Law School on behalf of the American Civil
Liberties Union).
140. See, e.g., ACLU v. Blackhorse Pike Reg. Bd. of Educ., (Dkt. No. 93-5368 (3d Cir.
Jun. 25, 1993); Gearon v. Loudon County Sch. Bd., 844 F. Supp. 1097 (E.D. Va. 1993).
Only one federal court has chosen to follow Jones. See Adler v. Duval County Sch. Bd., 851
F. Supp. 446 (M.D. Fla. 1994). Prior to Jones, several courts had addressed similar issues
and reached different conclusions to those proffered by the court in Jones. See Jager v.
Douglas County Sch. Dist., 862 F.2d 824 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1090 (1989)
(holding that prayers at public high school football games violated the First Amendment,
even though student clubs designated the prayer givers); Karen B. v. Treen, 653 F.2d 897
(5th Cir. 1981), affd, 455 U.S. 913 (1982) (holding that the Establishment Clause
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majorities the power of the state without constitutional restrictions
undermines the limitations on majority oppression the Constitution
establishes."14
Any other view, the court contended "would allow
school boards in religious communities generally to avoid Establishment
Clause concerns in the public schools. The school board could allow
students to vote daily prayers and the Ten Commandments back into
their classrooms."' 4 2
The Fifth Circuit may also have impaired its own ruling. In Doe v.
Duncanville Independent School District,42 the court whose majority
included the author of Jones upheld a preliminary injunction against the
practice of prayers before high school basketball games, whether coachled or student-led.'" Since attendance at sports events is far more
voluntary than school assemblies or graduations, the logic of Jones
collapses entirely under this subsequent decision by the Fifth Circuit.
A federal court in Mississippi recently held that the Jones formulation
was limited to graduation and could not be extended to other school
events.'4"5 Thus, in no jurisdiction, has student-initiated, student-led
classroom prayer, even when denominated as speech, withstood
constitutional scrutiny.
V. RELIGIOUS EXPRESSION PROTECTIONS ARE NOT COTERMINOUS WITH
THE GUARANTEES AFFORDED OTHER SPEECH

There can be no doubt that "religious worship and discussion... are
forms of speech and association protected by the First Amendment."'
Still, even though there has long been a relationship between religion
and speech, one that fully justifies their appearance within the same
constitutional amendment, there are substantial differences as well. The
First Amendment protects both "free exercise" and "freedom of speech."
These protections would be consonant, except for the further limitation
on "establishment of religion." 47 No corresponding limitation on

prohibited student volunteers from leading fellow classmates in prayer, even though
students could be excused from participating); Collins v. Chandler Unified Sch. Dist., 644
F.2d 759 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 863 (1981) (holding unconstitutional
student-initiated, student-led prayer and Bible readings at school assemblies).
141. Harris v. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 241,41 F.3d 447,455 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. pending.

142. Id.
143. 994 F.2d at 160.
144. Id. at 168.
145. Ingebretsen v. Jackson Pub. School Dist., 864 F. Supp. 1473 (S.D. Miss. 1994),
appeal pending.
146. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269 (1981).
147. Cf. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 218-19 (quoting with approval Everson, 330 U.S. at 52
(Rutledge, J., dissenting)).
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government "establishment of speech" exists. Recently, the Supreme
Court discussed this proposition and its importance in distinguishing
between religion and expression:
The First Amendment protects speech and religion by quite different
mechanisms. Speech is protected by insuring its full expression even
when the government participates, for the very object of some of our
most important speech is to persuade the government to adopt an idea
as its own. The method for protecting freedom of worship and freedom
of conscience in religious matters is quite the reverse. In religious
debate or expression the government is not a prime participant, for the
Framers deemed religious establishment antithetical to the freedom of
all. The Free Exercise Clause embraces a freedom of conscience and
worship that has close parallels in the speech provisions of the First
Amendment, but the Establishment Clause is a specific prohibition on
forms of state intervention in religious affairs with no precise counterpart in the speech provisions.'"
The religious and expressive elements of the First Amendment have
different historical bases and were designed to address different
evils.149 The State is obligated to draw distinctions between these two
forms of expression. Thus, government has had a constitutionally
authorized role in providing financial assistance to further the exercise
of free speech (e.g., art, educational broadcasting, even public education).
At the same time, it is constitutionally prohibited from providing
financial assistance to the exercise of religion.
Moreover, the Constitution does not require that the State be
"ideologically neutral. "z5s It does require that the State be religiously
neutral. 1 ' Even though political majorities may use their power to
advance their ideologies, those engaged in religious exercise cannot

Our constitutional policy ... does deny that the state can undertake or sustain
(religious training, teaching or observance] in any form or degree. For this reason
the sphere of religious activity, as distinguished from the secular intellectual
liberties, has been given the two fold protection and, as the state cannot forbid,
neither can it perform or aid in performing the religious function.
Id.
148. Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2657-58 (citations omitted). See also Lathrop v. Donohue, 367
U.S. 820, 852 (1961) (Harlan, J., concurring) (there is a "clear distinction in the wording
of the First Amendment between the protections of speech and religion, only the latter
providing a protection against 'establishment.'"). Id.
149. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 n.127 (1976) (per curiam). See also Flast v.
Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 125 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("the historical purposes of... the
First Amendment are significantly more obscure and complex than this Court has
heretofore acknowledged."). Id.
150. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717 (1977).
151. See, e.g., Schempp, 374 U.S. at 222.
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foster their beliefs through the offices of the state.152 Changing the
claim to freedom of speech from freedom of religion does not change the
equation; it "has never meant that a majority could use the machinery
of the State to practice its beliefs. "15
Even advocates of a lower wall of separation between church and state
believe coerced attendance at religious worship violates the Constitution's religious liberty guarantee. Yet, no one would say such a
constitutional violation occurs when students are compelled to attend an
assembly where a speaker propagates one-sided political views. By the
same token, a teacher is not constitutionally prohibited from advocating
or criticizing, for example, political liberalism. But that same teacher
may not engage in the similar advocacy or criticism of Christianity,
Buddhism or atheism. Justice Thurgood Marshall once put it this way:
"although a school may permissibly encourage its students to become
well rounded as student-athletes, student-musicians, and student-tutors,
the Constitution forbids schools to encourage students to become well
rounded as student-worshippers.""' It is precisely for this reason, the
Equal Access Act does not permit teacher participation in student Bible
Clubs," even though school personnel may participate in other noncurricular student clubs.
The Ninth Circuit has twice rejected the argument that there is a
"meaningful distinction between school authorities actually organizing
the religious activity and officials merely 'permitting' students to direct
the exercises."" s It is indisputable that a delegation of governmental
authority has occurred when time is set aside that may be used by
students solely for purposes of prayer. This cannot satisfy the requirements of the First Amendment, for it is axiomatic that government may
not accomplish indirectly what it is forbidden from doing by the
Obviously, if a true public forum were
Constitution directly."'

152. Id. at 226.
153. Id.
154. Mergens, 496 U.S. at 265-66 (Marshall, J., concurring).

155. 20 U.S.C. § 4071(c)(1), (2), (4) & (5) (1984).
156. Harris,41 F.3d at 452 (quoting with approval Collins v. Chandler Unified Sch.
Dist., 644 F.2d 759, 761 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 863 (1981)). The Ninth

Circuit went on to quote Collins about the lack of voluntariness in student-initiated,
student-led prayer at school assemblies:,
The ... students must either listen to a prayer chosen by a select group of
students or forego the opportunity to attend a major school function. It is difficult
to conceive how this choice would not coerce a student wishing to be part of the

social mainstream and, thus, advance one group's religious beliefs.
Id. (quoting Collins, 644 F.2d at 762).

157. Compare Witters v. Washington Dep't of Serv. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 487
(1986) (noting that government aid to parents or students used at religious schools may
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created, it would not depend on majority rule, and it would open the
classroom and other school activities to other student speech, speech that
might be racy or critical of school authorities and that officials would be
loath to encourage. Still, there is a constitutionally cognizable difference
between a school permitting an announcement over the intercom that
the Bible Club will meet at three o'clock and permitting the offering of
a prayer to induce attendance.
Those who advance the idea of prayer as free speech find solace in
Justice Lewis Powell's observation that "[there is no indication when
'singing hymns, reading scripture, and teaching biblical principles,' cease
to be 'singing, teaching, and reading-all apparently forms of 'speech',
despite their religious subject matter-and become unprotected
Powell, on behalf of the Widmar majority, even won'worship. ' " '
dered if a judicially manageable line could be drawn to separate
protected free speech from impermissible religious worship.15
These are remarkable statements, for read alone they indicate an
abdication of judicial responsibility.6 0 Even though there is no role for
the judiciary in making theological judgments,"" almost all judicial
decisionmaking is a matter of line-drawing. This is especially true of
church-state cases." 2 In the church-state arena, the courts have quite
properly taken on the task of separating religious worship from protected
religious expression. Justice Arthur Goldberg's description in Schempp
of how schools ought to relate to religion has become the standard: the
Constitution allows "teaching about religion, as distinguished from the
teaching of religion, in the public schools."'

still have an unconstitutional effect even if the government involvement is indirect) Id.;
Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299 (1966) (stating that private conduct may become
ascribable to the state when government involvement is high). Id.
158. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 269 n.6.
159. Id.
160. In fact, the Widmar majority later admits
the Establishment Clause requires the State to distinguish between "religious"
speech-speech, undertaken or approved by the State, the primary effect of which
is to support an establishment of religion--and "nonreligious" speech-speech,
undertaken or approved by the State, the primary effect of which is not to support
an establishment of religion. This distinction is required by the plain text of the
Constitution.
Id. at 272 n.9. Those who plaintively contend that all student religious speech is immune
from the Establishment Clause's requirements read too much into Widmar's footnote 6.
161. See, e.g., United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 87-88 (1944) (holding that courts
may not inquire into the truth, validity or reasonableness of a person's religious beliefs).
162. Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2661 (Establishment Clause "jurisprudence... is of necessity
one of line-drawing.. ."). Id.
163. 374 U.S. at 306 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (emphasis added).

1152

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46

In evaluating compliance with this constitutional distinction, courts
necessarily determine whether religion is being practiced as opposed to
being studied as an academic pursuit. It is not an easy task. Previous
courts have realized both the unavoidability as well as the delicacy of
the inquiry Determining "[wihen instruction turns to proselyting and
imparting knowledge becomes evangelism is, except in the crudest cases,
a subtle inquiry."16" The difficulty of the inquiry does not, however,
immunize it from judicial scrutiny, for nothing less than the vindication
of the American idea of religious liberty is at stake."
How might courts distinguish between protected religious expression
and the sort of religious worship that they are obliged to prevent?
Obviously, context is everything. Has a public forum, limited or open,
been established, and are students free to express themselves on any
topic under the sun? If so, whatever is expressed is more easily
attributable to the student-speaker than to the State. Thus, a student
in biology class may answer a question about the theory of evolution
with a statement about how he believes in the Biblical story of creation,
because of the kind of forum that has been established and because the
student meets the requirements of germaneness that teachers may
impose on the class. Thus, also, a graduation valedictorian, chosen in
the usual manner and not because she was likely to utter a prayer, may
speak of her faith and say a prayer, notwithstanding the Court's decision
in Lee. Still, under no circumstances, may school officials carve out of
the school day or school activities a time that is set aside for prayer.
For those who insist there is no legal difference between religious
advocacy, which is usually protected speech,"'6 and religious worship,
one measure of what side of the constitutional ledger the expression falls
on is to view prayer as the Court in Engel did: as "a solemn avowal of

164. McCollurn, 333 U.S. at 236 (Jackson, J., concurring).
165. James Madison implicitly recognized as much when he said on the floor of the
House of Representatives in 1789 that:
I must admit moreover that it may not be easy, in every possible case, to trace the
line of separation between the rights of religion and the Civil authority with such
distinctness as to avoid collisions & doubts on unessential points. The tendency
to a usurpation on one side or the other, or to a corrupting coalition or alliance

between them, will be best guarded agst. by an entire abstinence of the Govt. from
interference in any way whatever, beyond the necessity of preserving public order,
& protecting each sect apt. trespasses on its legal rights by others.
ALLEY, supra note 2, at 67.
166. Obviously, such speech is subject to time, place or manner restrictions. Repeated
proselytizing in the face of a requests to stop will at some point become punishable
harassment. See, e.g., Turic v. Holland Hospitality, Inc., 842 F. Supp. 971 (W.D. Mich.
1994).
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divine faith and supplication for the blessings of the Almighty."16 7 As
the Eleventh Circuit has stated, prayer is the "quintessential religious
practice."' 8 The First Amendment forbids169State sponsorship, endorsement or encouragement of those practices.
The decision in Mergens does not change this calculus. Attendance at
the Bible Club meetings was entirely voluntary, as it was at any noncurricular club meeting. Such meetings were also scheduled at times
that would not interfere with the curricular program of the school. Most
importantly, the religious meetings were not sponsored or encouraged by
the school, nor did school officials participate, except on a custodial
basis.'70 No case has yet recognized, and could not consistent with
constitutional principles, a right on the part of schools to create
recognized periods for prayer.
Treating religious exercises as free speech does substantial disservice
to the importance of prayer. This deeply personal communication with
higher authority is imbued with theological content. Yet, every time the
courts have justified state involvement with something that is palpably
religious they have changed its nature, turning it into something secular
and cultural. The Court did this with a wave of the judicial gavel,
without so much as an incantation, to Christmas 7and Chanukah, which
became "contemporaneous cultural tradition[s]."1 1
Similarly, a challenge to the inscription, "In God We Trust," on our
coins and currency was repulsed by a court that found the phrase to be
"of a patriotic or ceremonial character," not to amount to "governmental
sponsorship of a religious exercise," and to be without "theological or
ritualistic impact."'72 The significance of this decision lies in its
apparent ability to separate God from religion in a manner that
denigrates and diminishes religious faith by substituting a civic religion
of the government's own invention.'7 3 Rather than trust in God, as the
motto indicates, we are being told to trust in our country and God will
come along for the ride. It is this line of reasoning, not that which

167. Engel, 370 U.S. at 424.
168.

Jaffree v. Wallace, 705 F.2d 1526, 1534 (11th Cir. 1983), affd, 472 U.S. 38 (1985).

169. Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992).
170.

496 U.S. at 232-34.

171. County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 615.
172. Aronow v. United States, 432 F.2d 242, 243 (9th Cir. 1970). See also O'Hair v.
Blumenthal, 462 F. Supp. 19 (W.D. Tex. 1978), afftd, 588 F.2d 1144 (5th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 442 US. 930 (1979).

173. See Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2657 ("The suggestion that government may establish an
official or civic religion as a means of avoiding the establishment of a religion with more
specific creeds strikes us as a contradiction [of the Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment] that cannot be accepted."). Id.
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upholds separation of church and state, that evidences hostility to
religion.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Madison warned us that "it is proper to take alarm at the first
experiment on our liberties."174 The current campaign aimed at
expanding existing rights to engage in religious exercise in the public
schools is at odds with the American idea of religious liberty, one that
has seen religion flourish in all its diverse forms.
In its most straightforward form, the constitutional amendment
movement would authorize the government to tell school children when,
where, with whom, and how they should pray. Yet, "[olur Founders
were no more willing to let the content of their prayers and their
privilege of praying whenever they pleased be influenced by the ballot
box than they were to let these vital matters of personal conscience
depend upon the succession of monarchs." 7 '
Recasting religious exercise as mere speech does not alter the
calculation. The Establishment Clause operates uniquely as a bar to
governmentally sponsored religion, even ifit takes the form of expression
or expressive activities. Moreover, no one may "use secular institutions
to force one or some religion on any person .... [Government] may not
thrust any sect on any person."' 7
Unlike the facile claims of some, this does not amount to hostility to
the religious majority. The opportunities to engage in religious speech
and practice are myriad and well-protected by the Constitution. There
is even substantial evidence that these existing protections are well-used
by the religious majority. Protestant values and speech, reflecting the
religion of most Americans, permeate all of society. "The free marketplace of ideas that American society emphasizes naturally benefits the
majority Protestant religion and its values," two researchers recently
observed. 177 "This was most vividly portrayed in 1992 by the results
of a Gallup survey that American Catholics were moving away from
their bishops' positions on some issues and closer to the views of a
majority of their fellow citizens, who are Protestant."7 s The permeation of this kind of speech throughout society, and the innate desire of

174.

MIND, supra note 43, at 8.

175. Id.
176. Zorach, 343 U.S. at 314.
177.

KOSMIN-LACHMAN, supra note 69, at 10.

178. Id. (indicating that a majority of American Catholics now favor the ordination of
women as priests, the right of priests to marry, and the use of condoms to prevent AIDS,
even though the Church has taken a contrary position). Id
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humans to belong, may also explain why "many more Jews observe
Chanukah, which coincides with Christmas, and Passover, which
coincides with Easter, than observe the equally important holidays of
Sukkot (Tabernacles) and Shavuot (Pentecost), which do not coincide
with any major Christian holidays."'7
To be sure, religion evokes passions that cannot be approximated by
those who exhibit a zeal for Democratic or Republican politics. No
matter how committed one is to health care or a strong military, it does
not have the hold or the promise of religious devotion. No political
ideology or social philosophy has the same degree of centrality in
people's lives or basic conduct as does their religious faith. Religion
necessarily receives different treatment by the Constitution. As Justice
Frankfurter noted:
The claims of religion were not minimized by refusing to make the
public schools agencies for their assertion .... The sharp confinement
of the public schools to secular education was a recognition of the need
of a democratic society to educate its children, insofar as the State
undertook to do so, in an atmosphere free from pressures in a realm in
which pressures are most resisted and where conflicts are most easily
and most bitterly engendered.' °
The Framers well knew that the "essence of Government is power.""8 ' To permit government to exercise any power over religion, even
a generally encouraging one, is to permit it to define what is religion and
how it may be observed. Instead, our Constitution commits us to the
idea that government and religion operate in separate spheres.
Government may not even play a suggestive role, for "[an advisory
Government is a contradiction in terms." 2 It can only result "in a
conformity to the creed of the majority and a single sect, if amounting
to a majority."183
No argument to the contrary has been put forth with sufficient force
or appeal to change these observations. People of all faiths, as well as
those who have none, must be able to "sit down at the common table...,
without any inquisition into their faith, or mode of worship. " '" Any

179. Id. at 12.
180. McCollum, 333 U.S. at 216.
181. Address of James Madison to the Virginia Convention (Dec. 2, 1829), reprintedin
MIND, supra note 43, at 403.
182. Madison, supra note 30, at 93.
183. Id.
184. STORY, supra note 124, at § 992, at 703.
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that would
other view yields to government an "impious presumption"
1 15
permit it to assume "dominion over the faith of others."
The wisdom of the First Amendment remains unassailable. Only by
refusing to permit government and its instrumentalities from becoming
theaters of religious rivalry can the freedom of each and every denomination and of all nonbelievers remain secure. In this manner, "[tihe
spiritual mind of man has thus been free to believe, disbelieve, or doubt,
without repression, great or small, by the heavy hand of government."18

185. JEFFERSON, supra note 54, at 206.
186. Zorach, 343 U.S. at 319-20 (Black, J., dissenting).

